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THE HEALTH CARE WORKFORCE: HOW TO UNDERSTAND 
ACCOMMODATIONS 
LESLIE FRANCIS* AND ANITA SILVERS** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The celebrations of the twenty-fifth birthday of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA) have sounded the somber note that people with 
disabilities continue to be under-employed and unemployed in disproportionate 
numbers. In his speech at the reception honoring the ADA, President Obama 
remarked: “But we all know too many people with disabilities are still 
unemployed -- even though they can work, even though they want to work, 
even though they have so much to contribute.”1 
Representing as it does nearly twenty percent of gross domestic product 
(GDP),2 health care has the potential to contribute either to the creation or to 
the alleviation of apparently endemic employment problems for people with 
disabilities. Third party payers pay for so much of health care that arguably 
any costs associated with workplace accommodations—if indeed there are 
any—are widely shared. And one way in which health care contributes to the 
general society is to return to citizens who have suffered illness or injury the 
capacity to work. So if any employers should understand accommodating 
individuals with disabilities who can work and want to work, the health care 
industry might seem to be the place. 
 
* Leslie P. Francis is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, Distinguished Alfred C. Emery 
Professor of Law, and Director of the Center for Biomedical Sciences and Law at the University 
of Utah. Research for this article was supported by the Excellence in Research and Teaching fund 
of the S.J. Quinney College of Law. We are grateful for research assistance from Anikka Hoidal, 
2L, S.J. Quinney College of Law. 
** Anita Silvers, Ph.D., is Professor and Chair of Philosophy at San Francisco State University. 
She has been awarded the American Philosophical Association Quinn Prize for service to 
philosophy and philosophers and the Phi Beta Kappa Society Lebowitz Prize for philosophical 
achievement. She serves as a community representative on the San Francisco General Hospital 
Ethics Committee. 
 1. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the 
President on the Americans With Disabilities Act (July 20, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
the-press-office/2015/07/20/remarks-president-americans-disabilities-act. 
 2. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., National Health Expenditure Data Historical, 
CMS (Oct. 16, 2015), https://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-data-and-systems/statistics-trends-
and-reports/nationalhealthexpenddata/nationalhealthaccountshistorical.html. 
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Yet employment in health care for people with disabilities can appear to 
pose intractable problems not found elsewhere in the workforce. How can a 
paraplegic—much less a quadriplegic—physician effectively conduct patients’ 
physical examinations? How can a deaf psychologist interact with patients 
appropriately, unless she is delivering services as a sign language user to 
another member of the Deaf community? How can a visually impaired nurse 
manage the complexities of intensive care unit (ICU) care? How can a person 
with chronic fatigue syndrome who requires flexible scheduling often with 
little notice, or a person with diabetes who requires frequent breaks for testing 
blood sugar, provide the time-sensitive staffing for respiratory care service? 
And how can a person with intellectual disabilities function in the complex 
world of health care, except for very limited tasks such as laundry delivery or 
waste removal? These and many other questions suggest that health care might 
not be a likely venue to address the myriad employment issues facing people 
with disabilities today. 
To be sure, there are some common answers to these questions. The 
assumptions on which they rest reflect stereotypes about people with 
disabilities and how their capabilities may be limited. The assumptions also 
reflect a failure of imagination about readily available alternative ways of 
accommodating tasks that are familiar to people with disabilities and thus 
relegate people with disabilities only to the tasks that they can perform in 
standard fashion. They fail to appreciate other skills that people with 
disabilities may bring to health care, such as the expansive understanding that 
people with disabilities working in rehabilitative medicine can provide to 
others based on their own experience with making use of these services. These 
are all important points, but they will not be our concern in this article, for 
employment success of people with disabilities will continue to be marginal at 
best without a fuller and deeper account of what is meant by “reasonable 
accommodations”3 within the context of the ADA as a civil rights statute. 
In this article, we deploy an approach to reasonable accommodations that 
challenges the depiction of health care as a problematic target to expand 
employment opportunities of people with disabilities. After an explanation of 
what we mean by reasonable accommodations as a civil right, we turn to 
themes in the case law involving requests for accommodations by health care 
workers. In some cases, courts have engaged in a careful assessment of 
employers’ claims about essential job responsibilities—assessments that might 
be undertaken more widely by health care employers. On the other hand, 
where employers raise concerns about patient safety or about supposedly 
neutral on-the-job rules, courts may be too likely to defer. Further, courts have 
had a history of giving problematic deference to medical professionals’ 
 
 3. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (2015). 
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judgments about training programs and assessment of qualifications that 
adversely affect the pipeline of potentially qualified health care workers. We 
conclude by suggesting that our analysis has broader implications for how the 
health care profession may comply with the ADA in addressing employment of 
people with disabilities. 
II.  REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS 
The ADA provides that it is employment discrimination to fail to make 
“reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an 
otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or 
employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation 
would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business . . . .”4 
Similarly, it is discrimination to deny employment opportunities to a job 
applicant or employee who is otherwise qualified based on the need to make 
reasonable accommodation.5 The ADA gives examples of what might be 
reasonable accommodations without providing a definition of the concept: 
[Accommodations] may include (A) making existing facilities used by 
employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and 
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a 
vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, 
appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or 
policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar 
accommodations for individuals with disabilities.6 
The proscriptions on employment discrimination in the ADA are subject to 
a “direct threat” defense. Qualification standards may include a requirement 
“that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other 
individuals in the workplace.”7 This is a defense: the employer bears both the 
burden of producing the evidence and the burden of persuasion.8 The 
employer’s proof may not rest on stereotypes but must provide an 
individualized, objective analysis of why the individual poses risks in the 
actual circumstances of the job, based on the best medical knowledge.9 
 
 4. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012). 
 5. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(B). 
 6. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2012). 
 7. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2012). This provision has been interpreted to cover threats to self. 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 87 (2002). 
 8. EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 477 F.3d 561, 571-72 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 9. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (2015); see, e.g., Jarvis v. Potter, 500 F.3d 1113, 1121-22 (10th 
Cir. 2007). 
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Before implementation of the ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA)10 in 
2009, many plaintiffs claiming disability discrimination found their cases 
dismissed because they did not meet the Supreme Court’s very stringent test 
for being disabled and thus coming within the coverage of the statute. The 
ADAAA reversed this trend with its rule of construction favoring “broad 
coverage.”11 Now surviving motions to dismiss or motions for summary 
judgment on the question of disabilities, many plaintiffs are facing similar 
motions on whether they are qualified to perform essential functions of the job 
with or without accommodations.12 This development places significant 
pressures on essential job functions, reasonableness of accommodations, 
analysis of undue hardship, and assessment of dangers that might be cited in a 
direct threat defense.13 
In Accommodating Every Body, we, with our coauthors, argued that 
accommodations should be tested by whether they were effective in enabling 
the person with disabilities to perform the job in question.14 This is the initial 
showing that it is reasonable for the employee to make: that with the 
accommodation, the employee would be able to do the job. The burden of 
going forward would then shift to the employer to explain why the employee 
could not succeed in performing the job with the suggested accommodation, 
why the employee has misconstrued the essential functions of the job, or why 
the accommodation would be an undue hardship. The employer might also 
advance the defense that the employee poses risks to the health or safety of 
others. The burden of persuasion would remain on the plaintiff to demonstrate 
that the accommodation would enable her to do the job; as undue hardship and 
direct threat are defenses, these burdens of persuasion would lie with the 
employer. 
Accommodating Every Body further explained that when reasonable 
accommodations are civil rights needed to achieve equality in the face of 
salient differences, they are not special benefits or privileges.15 They enable 
 
 10. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (codified at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213). 
 11. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(a) (2012). 
 12. See Michael Ashley Stein et al., Accommodating Every Body, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 
721-23, 726-28 (2014). 
 13. See generally Mark C. Weber, Unreasonable Accommodation and Due Hardship, 62 
FLA. L. REV. 1119 (2010) (discussing accommodation requirements, the meaning of reasonable 
accommodation, and undue hardship); Ani B. Satz, Disability, Vulnerability, and the Limits of 
Antidiscrimination, 83 WASH. L. REV. 513, 518-19, 556, 558 (2008) (discussing accommodations 
and definition of direct threat). 
 14. Stein et al., supra note 12, at 693 (arguing that this approach should be broadened to 
apply to all work-capable individuals in need of accommodations, without the need to establish 
disability identity). 
 15. Id. at 695-96. 
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individuals to perform on the same terms as others when workplace design, job 
structures, employer policies, or other features of the work environment might 
otherwise have excluded them.16 They start from the background that these 
workplace features are not neutral; they bear differently on people who do not 
fit paradigms of the typical or usual worker. If these differences track historical 
exclusions, as they do with disability, holding them up to scrutiny is a matter 
of civil rights: would proposed changes (“accommodations”) be reasonable? 
Or, would proposed changes still leave the employee unable to perform the job 
(unable to perform “essential functions of the job”), be too burdensome for the 
employer (an “undue hardship”), or be too risky for anyone (a “direct threat”)? 
Thus understood, the reasonable accommodation requirement serves the 
inclusion goals of the ADA. 
This accommodation requirement includes adjustment of the physical 
construction of the work place: routes of access; workstations; accessibility of 
bathrooms and other facilities; and parking.17 It also includes equipment design 
such as computers, telephones, or methods of intra-office communication.18 It 
requires employers to permit employees to perform tasks in non-standard 
ways, so long as the performance is accomplished safely and effectively.19 It 
may require employers to adjust non-essential job responsibilities20 or 
workplace rules.21 It may even require employers to reassign employees to 
different positions,22 but this mandate does not extend to eliminating essential 
job requirements or to creating new positions.23 Nor does it require employers 
to assign employees to positions for which they are not qualified.24 
 
 16. Id. at 696-97. 
 17. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2012); e.g., Feist v. La. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Attorney 
Gen., 730 F.3d 450, 453 (5th Cir. 2013) (on-site parking); Nixon-Tinkelman v. NYC Dep’t of 
Health & Mental Hygiene, 434 F. App’x 17, 19-20 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting employers may also 
have the obligation to assist with the employee’s commute under certain circumstances such as a 
job transfer to a difficult-to-reach location). 
 18. E.g., Noll v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 787 F.3d 89, 92-93, 95 (2d Cir. 2015) (noting the 
requirement of reasonable accommodations does not require the employer to provide 
accommodations demanded by the employee, so long as the accommodations provided are 
reasonable). 
 19. E.g., Osborne v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. 798 F.3d 1260, 1264, 1269-70 (10th Cir. 
2015). In this case, a deaf applicant for a plasma center technician position at a plasmapheresis 
facility proposed that she could monitor donor safety with visual rather than auditory alarms; the 
appellate court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the employer on the 
question of reasonable accommodations. Id. 
 20. Shell v. Smith, 789 F.3d 715, 721 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 21. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 418 (2002). 
 22. Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1161 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 23. E.g., Dalton v. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention & Agency for Toxic Substances 
& Disease Registry, 602 F. App’x 749, 755 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 24. Gera v. County of Schuylkill, No. 14-4789, 2015 WL 4269963, at *2 (3d Cir. July 15, 
2015). 
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Not surprisingly, requirements further along this list have proved 
especially contentious, far more so than alterations of the physical work 
environment, technology, or means of communication. Employers may 
contend that non-standard methods of performance are not effective, as when a 
deaf employee argues that she can use visual rather than auditory cues but the 
employer questions the reliability or feasibility of the visual cues.25 When an 
employee requests adjustment of job responsibilities, the employer may 
contend that the responsibilities in question are essential job functions and so 
the employee is not qualified to perform the job as defined by the employer.26 
Employers may contend that otherwise neutral work rules are non-
discriminatory27 or that it would be an undue hardship to change them, 
particularly when changes in the rules would affect other employees. And 
safety remains ever-present as a means to challenge whether the employee is 
qualified, with the direct threat defense remaining in the background to 
challenge whether the employee poses future risks.28 
The Supreme Court’s only ruling on accommodations, U.S. Airways, Inc. 
v. Barnett,29 has left a complex legacy with respect to otherwise neutral 
workplace rules that may affect other employees. In Barnett, the employee 
injured his back on the job as a cargo handler.30 Unable to continue to lift as 
required for a cargo handler, he transferred to a position in the mailroom.31 A 
mailroom position, however, was eventually opened to seniority-based bidding 
under a seniority system voluntarily adopted by U.S. Airways; Barnett lost out 
to a bid from an employee with greater seniority.32 The seniority system was 
not part of a collective bargaining agreement, and in announcing it, U.S. 
Airways specified that it was not a contractual obligation.33 Thus, U.S. 
Airways could not claim undue hardship on the basis of breach of contract.34 
Nonetheless, the district court granted summary judgment for U.S. Airways, 
holding that the seniority system precluded the accommodation sought by 
 
 25. Osborne v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 798 F.3d 1260, 1272-74 (10th Cir 2015). 
 26. E.g., Shell v. Smith, 789 F.3d 715, 717 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 27. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 51-53 (2003). 
 28. For example, an employee is not capable of performing essential job functions if he 
makes death threats to coworkers, even though his inability to handle stress is a symptom of his 
mental illness. Such an employee is not qualified and the employer does not need to provide the 
individualized assessment necessary to demonstrate that the employee is a direct threat because 
he poses risks of future harm. Mayo v. PCC Structurals, Inc., 795 F.3d 941, 943-45 (9th Cir. 
2015). 
 29. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002). 
 30. Id. at 394. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 404, 423. 
 34. See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 409-10. 
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Barnett.35 The appellate court reversed, applying the standard that the presence 
of the seniority system was one factor among many to be considered in 
determining whether the employer could succeed with an undue hardship 
defense.36 
Justice Breyer, writing for the Court, said that seniority systems normally 
prevail “in the run of cases.”37 The plaintiff, however, should be permitted to 
show that special circumstances demonstrate the reasonableness of an 
exception to this presumption and so the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment was mistaken.38 To argue that seniority systems are presumptively 
reasonable, Justice Breyer cited the expectations of other workers created by 
these systems.39 He left open, however, the possibility that Barnett might be 
able to show that the presumption did not apply because U.S. Airways had 
operated its seniority system sporadically and so had not created the usual 
employee expectations.40 
In reaching this result, Justice Breyer on the one hand rejected Barnett’s 
argument that the only test for the reasonableness of an accommodation is its 
effectiveness.41 Instead, Justice Breyer linked the idea of effectiveness to the 
accommodation itself: an alteration that does not enable the employee to do the 
job would not be an “accommodation” on his view.42 In support of linking 
efficacy with accommodation, Justice Breyer first advanced the linguistic 
claim that what makes something an “accommodation” is that it will work.43 
Second, Justice Breyer was concerned that on Barnett’s view the undue 
hardship defense would remain, but would function as a “mirror image” of 
reasonableness: the only way for an employer to argue that an accommodation 
is unreasonable would be to show that it comes within the defense.44 That is, 
an employer would not be able to argue that an accommodation was 
unreasonable without demonstrating that it would be an undue hardship.45 
Justice Breyer rejected this interpretation of the statute because he thought the 
employer might have other reasons for finding an accommodation 
unreasonable: 
Yet a demand for an effective accommodation could prove unreasonable 
because of its impact, not on business operations, but on fellow employees—
 
 35. Id. at 395. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 394. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 404. 
 40. Id. at 405-06. 
 41. Id. at 399. 
 42. Id. at 400. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 400. 
 45. Id. at 400-01. 
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say, because it will lead to dismissals, relocations, or modification of employee 
benefits to which an employer, looking at the matter from the perspective of 
the business itself, may be relatively indifferent.46 
So Barnett would need to show something more to demonstrate 
reasonableness: here, that operation of the seniority system was such that an 
alteration in this case would not be disruptive to other employees. 
On the other hand, Justice Breyer disagreed with U.S. Airways’ contention 
that whenever a requested accommodation violates an otherwise neutral 
workplace rule, it is thereby a “privilege,” a special benefit for the employee 
with a disability rather than equal treatment.47 Neutral workplace rules, Justice 
Breyer emphasized, must sometimes be subject to change to create equal 
opportunity.48 Justice O’Connor, concurring, would have drawn the narrower 
conclusion that seniority systems only receive special protection when they are 
legally enforceable.49 And Justice Scalia, dissenting, would have agreed with 
U.S. Airways that neutral employer rules are not disability discrimination, 
whether or not they concern seniority.50 
Justice Breyer’s opinion in Barnett can fairly be characterized as a 
balancing act between deferring to employer rules or practices only when 
changes in them would be an undue hardship and full deference to these rules 
or practices unless they explicitly discriminate on the basis of disability. Much 
territory lies unexplored between this Scylla of Barnett’s argument and 
Charybdis of Justice Scalia’s position, however. A particularly troubling 
question is when and how much of the burden of showing undue hardship will 
be in practice on Justice Breyer’s analysis shifted to plaintiffs claiming 
discriminatory failure to accommodate. Barnett argued that to require him to 
demonstrate more than efficacy would in practice shift the burden of proving 
undue hardship onto the employee.51 Justice Breyer’s final point in support of 
the identification of efficacy with accommodation rather than reasonableness 
was that it would not shift the burden of proof to the employee in the way 
asserted by Barnett.52 That is, according to Justice Breyer, identifying efficacy 
with accommodation would not leave the employee with burdens of 
demonstrating reasonableness that ought to be for the employer to prove as 
undue hardship.53 However, if the decision in Barnett is read to extend beyond 
seniority systems to hold that all neutral employer rules are reasonable in the 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 398. 
 48. Id. at 397. 
 49. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 408 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 50. Id. at 411-18 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 51. Id. at 400 (majority opinion). 
 52. Id. at 401. 
 53. Id. at 402. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2015] THE HEALTH CARE WORKFORCE 65 
run of cases and only subject to challenge if the employee can show problems 
with their application in the particular case, this shift in the burden of 
persuasion will be exactly the result Barnett feared. 
In Accommodating Every Body, we argued that efficacy should be the 
touchstone for reasonable accommodations.54 Our argument was that an 
accommodation is reasonable when it enables a work-capable individual to 
perform the job.55 It was also important to our argument that apparently neutral 
employer policies should be scrutinized as barriers to potentially effective 
performance just as other features of workplace design should be.56 That is, we 
contended that once employees have shown that an accommodation would 
enable them to do the job, it should not also be up to them to demonstrate that 
apparently neutral employer policies are unreasonable.57 It should instead be 
up to the employer to show that the policies are reasonable in the sense that 
changing the policies would constitute a hardship. This would put employers to 
the test of defending their policies, rather than requiring employees to show 
that it would be reasonable to change policies on grounds in addition to that 
changes would enable them to work successfully. If Justice Breyer’s 
identification of efficacy with accommodation is read to reach beyond treating 
seniority as a special case, and instead to establish a presumption of 
reasonableness for existing employer rules, the ADA will not achieve its full 
purpose of bringing work-capable individuals into jobs for which they are 
qualified. Instead, employer rules will remain set in stone unless the employer 
can show an undue hardship. Moreover, as Mark Weber carefully details, 
Justice Breyer’s analysis is at odds with the legislative history of the ADA, 
which suggests that reasonable accommodation and undue hardship are “two 
sides of the same coin,” with the duty to accommodate going up to the point at 
which an undue hardship defense comes into play.58 The undue hardship 
defense, Weber argues, should be read to bar accommodations that would 
function as fundamental alterations to the workplace.59 Such an argument 
could, of course, be made about a workplace that has long been governed by a 
 
 54. Stein et al., supra note 12, at 719. 
 55. Id. at 693, 744. 
 56. Id. at 698, 748-49. 
 57. Id. at 739. 
 58. Weber, supra note 13, at 1133. 
 59. Id. at 1138; Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 309 (1985) (holding that modifications 
to programs such as Medicaid to enhance access for people with disabilities were not required if 
they would be fundamental alterations in the program). Courts have also held that universities are 
not required to make alterations to accommodate students with disabilities if these are 
fundamental changes to academic programs. See, e.g., McGregor v. La. State Univ. Bd. of 
Supervisors, 3 F.3d 850, 858-59 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding accommodations requested by law 
student, including permission to attend classes on a part-time basis, would have required 
“substantial modification” in law school program, and were not required). 
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seniority system.60 Any broader interpretation of the employee’s burden, 
moreover, would appear to construe it more narrowly than the regulations, 
which state that the undue hardship defense includes the impact on the ability 
of other employees to perform their duties.61 This is information in the control 
of the employer rather than the employee, and thus should be part of the 
employer’s defense to the employee’s claim that an accommodation would be 
reasonable. 
In sum, changes in employer rules and practices, just like alterations of the 
physical contours of workplaces, should be considered as reasonable 
accommodations. The Supreme Court’s only decision on accommodations has 
left a problematic legacy about when plaintiffs must show more than efficacy 
in arguing that an accommodation is reasonable and how much is left to the 
employer to raise as a defense. As ADA litigation moves beyond whether 
plaintiffs fit within the statutory definition of disability, courts can be expected 
to face increasing numbers of cases placing at issue whether plaintiffs are 
qualified to perform essential job responsibilities with or without 
accommodation, as well as whether employers can succeed on undue hardship 
or direct threat defenses. If entrenched employer practices and rules serve as 
unalterable barriers to more inclusive workplaces, however, employee gains 
from the ADAAA may prove largely illusory. In the next section, we turn to 
some examples of disability discrimination litigation by health care workers 
that suggest how employers’ stipulations of essential job functions can be 
challenged successfully. Subsequent sections reveal how courts may be too 
deferential to employers’ judgments about hardships or risks of change and too 
ready to accept apparently neutral workplace policies or rules. We have 
identified these cases from a search of reported decisions in the past three years 
involving health care workers’ requests for reasonable accommodations.62 
 
 60. We leave aside here the more general problem of whether the protections given to 
seniority systems in employment discrimination law, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(h) (2012) (Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act), continue to serve as problematic barriers to the civil rights of employees 
who have experienced prior exclusion and so cannot benefit from these systems. See generally, 
Noah D. Zatz, Special Treatment Everywhere, Special Treatment Nowhere, 95 B.U. L. REV. 
1155, 1164-67 (2015); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 325-26 (1977). 
 61. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(v) (2015). 
 62. We performed a Westlaw search of the federal cases database for (ADA & “Title I” & 
accommodation & employment & (hospital or nurse or physician or “nursing home”)) & DA(aft 
08-02-2012)). We also reviewed the litigation update on the EEOC website. See, OFFICE OF GEN. 
COUNSEL, FACT SHEET ON RECENT EEOC LITIGATION-RELATED DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (INCLUDING THE ADAAA) (2015), http://www.eeoc.gov/ 
eeoc/litigation/selected/ada_litigation_facts.cfm. Numbers of the reported decisions involving 
health care workers are too small to permit reliable statistical analysis of the data, so we present 
illustrative cases only. 
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III.  REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS IN THE HEALTH CARE WORKPLACE: 
EMPLOYER DEFINITIONS OF ESSENTIAL JOB RESPONSIBILITIES 
Under the ADA, employees claiming discrimination must show that they 
are qualified to perform essential job functions with or without 
accommodations.63 “Essential job function” is not a defined term in the ADA64 
although the statutory definition of “qualified individual” includes the 
following: 
For the purposes of this subchapter, consideration shall be given to the 
employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an 
employer has prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing 
applicants for the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the 
essential functions of the job.65 
Essential job function is defined in the regulations as “fundamental job 
duties.”66 Reasons that employers may consider in determining that a job 
function is essential include that the job exists to perform that function, that a 
limited number of employees are available to perform the function so that it is 
difficult to redistribute, or that the function is highly specialized.67 Evidence of 
essentiality may include: the employer’s judgment about essentiality; written 
job descriptions prepared before advertising the position; amount of time spent 
on the job performing the function; the consequences of not requiring the job 
holder to perform the function; the terms of a collective bargaining agreement; 
the work experience of past holders of the job; or the current work experience 
of others holding similar jobs.68 
Inclusion of the employer’s judgment about essentiality in the statutory 
definition of qualified individual and in the regulations’ list of factors to be 
considered invites courts to defer to employers’ determinations of job 
responsibilities.69 One study indicates that courts consider employers’ 
judgments and written job descriptions far more than the other factors listed in 
the regulations.70 However, if employers’ stipulations merely reflect 
unchallenged assumptions about what functions jobs must include or how 
these functions are to be performed, they may effectively exclude people with 
 
 63. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2012). 
 64. See id. § 12111(8); 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2012). 
 65. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). 
 66. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (2015). 
 67. Id. § 1630.2(n)(2)(i)-(iii). 
 68. Id. § 1630.2(n)(3)(i)-(vii). 
 69. Michael E. Olsen, Jr., Note, Disabled but Unqualified: The Essential Functions 
Requirement as a Proxy for the Ideal Worker Norm, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1485, 1498-99, 1515 
(2015); Stephen F. Befort, An Empirical Examination of Case Outcomes Under the ADA 
Amendments Act, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2027, 2067 (2015). 
 70. Olsen, supra note 69, at 1499-1500. 
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disabilities who are capable of performing the job in non-standard ways. 
Several recent cases involving health care workers illustrate courts’ efforts to 
scrutinize employers’ claims about job responsibilities. 
Consider the dispute over the job responsibilities of Kristy Sones, a home 
health care nurse whose case was litigated by the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC).71 Sones originally worked as a field nurse 
for the LHC Group, Inc. traveling to see six to eight patients per day.72 She 
was in the process of becoming a team leader—the facts were in dispute 
whether she had actually moved to the team leader position—when she had an 
epileptic seizure at work.73 Her physician cleared her to return to work, but 
with driving restrictions for a year and on medications that, she claimed, left 
her tired and struggling with memory.74 She requested help in learning team 
leader duties and computer skills on a timeline that would permit adjustment of 
her seizure medications.75 She also requested permission for her mother to 
drive her to scheduled visits with patients on one day, which her supervisor 
granted.76 After she missed work without approval to take her child to the 
doctor and a patient requested assignment of a different home health nurse, 
LHC terminated Sones, stating that she was “a liability” to the company.77 
The district court granted summary judgment for LHC Group on the basis 
that the EEOC had not shown that Sones was qualified for either the field 
nurse or the team leader position, even with accommodations.78 The appellate 
court upheld the grant of summary judgment on the field nurse position 
because driving was an essential job function; here, it considered the amount of 
time employees were actually expected to spend driving and observed that the 
EEOC had not produced evidence that it would be feasible for Sones to use 
alternative methods of transportation with the frequency required.79 In contrast, 
the appellate court reversed summary judgment on the team leader position, 
finding the EEOC had raised questions of fact about the frequency with which 
team leaders were expected to see patients in the field and whether Sones 
might have been able to perform occasional field visits with van or taxi 
service, help from her mother, or public transportation.80 The court’s analysis 
 
 71. EEOC v. LHC Group, Inc., 773 F.3d 688, 692 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 693. 
 75. Id. 
 76. LHC Group, Inc., 773 F.3d at 693. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 698-99. It is unclear from the opinion whether the EEOC had simply failed to 
produce the evidence, believing that the employer’s permission to allow Sones’ mother to drive 
her to cases on one day would suffice, or whether the evidence was simply not available. 
 80. Id. at 699. 
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is a good illustration of how courts should consider actual time spent 
performing the alleged job responsibility in determining whether it is an 
essential function rather than simply relying on the employer’s 
representations.81 
In other cases, employers have stipulated that job responsibilities require 
employees to demonstrate individual capability to perform all tasks that are the 
responsibility of a workplace team. Employees with intellectual disabilities, for 
example, may be able to function well when they can work in concert with 
others but not if they are left to perform on their own.82 In one successful case, 
an employee with significant cognitive and physical disabilities from a cerebral 
abscess and strokes argued that rotating through all functions of the 
environmental services team was not an essential job responsibility.83 The 
hospital contended that all employees with his formal title of Environmental 
Technician “have the same primary job description and are expected to be able 
to perform all positions within the department.”84 The employee had worked 
successfully for several years as a housekeeper cleaning operating rooms; 
when he was transferred to removing trash from patient rooms on several 
hospital floors, he could not cope with the complexity and was fired despite his 
request for reassignment to cleaning the operating rooms.85 The district court 
granted summary judgment for the hospital based on the job description.86 In 
reversing, the court of appeals stated that evidence of how jobs actually 
function could rebut written job descriptions listing essential functions.87 
In another decision in which the employee contended that he could 
function as part of a team, the court rejected his argument based in large part 
on patient safety concerns.88 Stern was the chief psychologist at St. Anthony’s 
 
 81. The court also concluded that the EEOC had raised an issue of fact regarding whether 
LHC had engaged in required interactive process regarding Somes’ request for accommodations 
to master team leader duties. LHC Group, Inc., 773 F.3d at 700. 
 82. E.g., Leslie P. Francis, Employment and Intellectual Disability, 8 J. GENDER RACE & 
JUST. 299 (2004). 
 83. Mobley v. Miami Valley Hosp., 603 F. App’x 405, 406, 412, 413-14 (6th Cir. 2015). 
 84. Id. at 412. 
 85. Id. at 406-07. 
 86. Id. at 408. 
 87. Id. at 412. 
 88. Stern v. St. Anthony’s Health Ctr., 788 F.3d 276, 286 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Miller v. Ill. 
Dep’t of Transp., 643 F.3d 190, 198 (7th Cir. 2011), in which a bridge worker argued that it was a 
reasonable accommodation for him not to have to work in exposed positions over twenty-five feet 
high). The Miller court stated: 
We are confident that some high work in exposed or extreme positions is an essential 
function of the bridge crew as a whole. IDOT would have us take that point a step further 
to find that any individual assigned to the bridge crew had to be able to perform each and 
every task of the entire bridge crew. That would require finding that every task required of 
the bridge crew as a whole was an essential task of each bridge crew member. On this 
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Health Center and began experiencing memory loss, possibly attributable to 
early stage Alzheimer’s disease.89 The position included administrative 
responsibilities, supervisory responsibilities, and clinical care; the evidence 
indicated that these were all essential responsibilities of the position.90 Stern 
had requested several accommodations—reassignment of his supervisory 
responsibilities, assigning him less complex cases, or putting him on part time 
status—none of which he had evidence would enable him to perform essential 
job functions.91 In affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment to 
the employer, the court reasoned: “This case may be contrasted with a case 
involving one member of a team of employees working at an equal level. In a 
team environment, the ADA may require employers to think more flexibly 
about which functions are essential and what sorts of accommodations might 
be reasonable.”92 In any psychologist position, Stern would be required to see 
patients, and there were serious questions about whether he could competently 
treat the complex and sometimes self-harming children who were patients at 
St. Anthony’s.93 
In a case illustrating significant deference to employers’ judgments about 
what job responsibilities are essential, Leokadia Bryk, a nurse in the behavioral 
 
record, we cannot make that finding as a matter of law. Plaintiff has come forward with 
substantial evidence showing that his bridge crew did not actually work that way. The 
bridge crew worked as a team. No one person was assigned permanently to any one task. 
Although individual members of the team did various tasks as needed, there was no 
requirement that the bridge crew members rotate from task to task in an organized, routine 
fashion, such that it was necessary for any one member of the bridge crew to be able to do 
every task of the bridge crew as a whole. 
Miller has presented evidence that, at least prior to March 23, 2006, the team 
accommodated the various skills, abilities, and limitations of the individual team members 
by organizing itself according to those skills, abilities, and limitations. Maurizio could not 
weld, so the other members did the welding when it was required. Another co-worker 
refused to ride in the snooper bucket, so those tasks, when needed, went to others. This 
was also true of bridge spraying, yard mowing, and debris raking for a crew member with 
allergies. 
As in other “team” environments, the individual members took on tasks according to their 
capacities and abilities. Here, a reasonable fact-finder would have to conclude that some 
members of the bridge crew had to be able to work at heights in exposed or extreme 
positions so that the bridge crew—as a unit—could do its job, just as some members of 
the crew had to be able to weld, ride in the snooper bucket, spray, mow, and rake. That 
conclusion does not mean that the fact-finder would be required to conclude that each 
member of the bridge crew had to be able to do every task required of the entire team. 
Miller, 643 F.3d at 198-99. 
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health unit at St. Joseph’s Hospital, needed a cane to walk after hip surgery.94 
The accommodation she requested was use of the cane on a daily basis.95 The 
hospital refused, contending that she worked in a unit where she posed a risk of 
harm from patients grabbing her cane and that the ability to subdue patients 
safely was an essential element of the position; they then told her that she 
would need to apply for other positions or be terminated.96 Bryk produced 
evidence that she had never been involved in a situation requiring her to 
subdue patients in the three years she had worked at St. Joseph’s.97 She also 
pointed out that other implements were readily available to patients—brooms, 
mops, razors, walkers, and more—and that she used a wrist strap for her cane 
and was trained in safety procedures.98 In ruling on cross motions for summary 
judgment, the district court determined that subduing patients in emergencies is 
an essential function for a nurse on the psychiatric unit even if the need arises 
very rarely.99 Because the EEOC had not shown that the plaintiff could have 
subdued patients safely, it had not made out this part of the plaintiff’s prima 
facie case.100 
Bryk’s case was decided by a district court in the Eleventh Circuit; under 
Eleventh Circuit law, a safety risk analysis is part of the plaintiff’s burden in 
demonstrating that she is qualified to perform essential job functions.101 On 
this approach, the direct threat defense only comes into play as a genuine 
defense for the employer to prove when it is unrelated to how the employee 
performs essential job functions.102 So, for example, the employer would have 
to bear the burden of persuasion if an employee could perform job functions 
just as safely as anyone else but harbors a contagious disease or is likely to be 
harmed by chemical exposures. With the direct threat defense, the employer 
must conduct an individualized risk assessment;103 when the employee bears 
the burden of a safety analysis, all the employer needs to do is advance a 
plausible reason to think there might be a risk. Decisions such as this illustrate 
how employers’ stipulations about essential job functions may erect barriers 
for plaintiffs who must bear the burden of persuasion that they can perform job 
 
 94. EEOC v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., Inc., No. 8:13-cv-2723-T-30TGW, 2015 WL 685766, at *1 
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functions safely. Patient safety also becomes a barrier in cases questioning 
whether jobs can be performed in nonstandard ways, as discussed in the next 
section. 
IV.  REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS IN THE HEALTH CARE WORKPLACE: 
EMPLOYER JUDGMENTS ABOUT HOW JOBS ARE TO BE PERFORMED 
Some of the cases we surveyed involve workers performing jobs in non-
standard ways. Typical examples are deaf employees seeking to use visual 
cues or visually impaired employees seeking to use auditory cues. In the cases 
described below, facts relevant to a direct threat defense are incorporated into 
the plaintiffs’ burden of persuasion that the job can be performed safely with 
their proposed accommodations. 
Consider Kelly Osborne, who is deaf and applied to work as a plasma 
center technician.104 Biolife conditionally offered her the position, but its 
human resources director, on reviewing her pre-employment physical, 
determined that she could not safely perform the position because she would 
not be able to hear the alarms on the plasmapheresis machine or donor calls for 
help.105 She proposed accommodations such as enhanced alerts on the 
machines, call buttons for donors to use to alert her about difficulties not 
registered by the machine, or a hearing oral interpreter.106 The district court 
granted summary judgment for the employer on the basis that she had not 
raised an issue of fact about her ability to perform the essential functions of the 
job with accommodations.107 In reversing, the appellate court applied a three-
step test drawn specifically from Barnett.108 First, Osborne needed to show that 
the accommodation seemed reasonable “ordinarily or in the run of cases.”109 
Then, the burden of going forward shifts to the employer to present evidence 
of its inability to accommodate in the form of special and specific 
circumstances that demonstrate undue hardship.110 If the employer succeeds in 
so doing, the employee must then come forward with evidence concerning her 
individual capabilities and suggestions for accommodations; the employee “at 
all times bears the ultimate burden of persuas[ion]….”111 This case presented 
what the appellate court described as “an additional legal standard” in the form 
of a direct threat defense.112 The evidence indicated significant adverse 
 
 104. Osborne v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 798 F.3d 1260, 1264 (10th Cir. 2015). 
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 106. Id. at 1265. 
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reactions in 0.0004% of plasma donors.113 The district court had concluded 
that this evidence of risk established as a matter of law the plaintiff’s failure to 
show that she was qualified to perform essential job functions safely.114 The 
appellate court determined that this was the wrong legal standard for the direct 
threat defense—which required a showing of significant risk—and reversed the 
grant of summary judgment.115 
However, the Tenth Circuit in Osborne, like the Eleventh Circuit, 
incorporated evidence of safety into the plaintiff’s prima facie case.116 On 
remand, Osborne needed to show that the accommodations she proposed—
visual alarms coupled with donor call buttons—did not pose significant risks in 
comparison to other ways of performing the job.117 It would then be the 
employer’s burden of production to bring evidence that these accommodations 
were an undue hardship or a significant risk.118 Crucially, the appellate court 
left the burden of persuasion on all these points to the plaintiff, including the 
showing of risk.119 Like Bryk, Osborne was unable to take advantage of the 
burden shifting or the individualized risk assessment required for the direct 
threat defense.120 
Or consider Reynolds, an art therapist with vision and hearing impairments 
at a substance abuse and psychiatric treatment facility.121 Reynolds’ hearing 
was corrected to normal levels, but her vision only allowed her to see at twenty 
inches or less and to recognize faces at twenty feet.122 One of her duties was to 
ensure a safe therapeutic environment, including monitoring patient behavior 
and recording observations accurately, duties the employer claimed were 
essential in a facility where patients were sometimes suicidal or violent.123 The 
facility used a check board to record observations of patients.124 Reynolds 
requested an accommodation for the board to be made bold or grayscale so that 
she could see patient names and link them properly to check boxes; the board 
was not modified, however, and Reynolds was ultimately discharged because 
of inaccuracies in recording information and complaints by co-workers about 
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her responsiveness to patients.125 The hospital moved for summary judgment, 
contending that Reynolds was not qualified to perform essential job 
functions.126 All agreed that she had the necessary training and skills to 
perform the job, but the employer claimed that because of her sensory 
impairments she could not do so safely.127 Like the Osborne court, the court in 
Reynolds included demonstration of the ability to perform the job safely as part 
of the plaintiff’s prima facie case.128 Although the court concluded that she had 
raised sufficient issues of material fact about her level of vision, the frequency 
with which she misidentified patients and staff members, and the reasons for 
her errors with the check board to survive summary judgment, it cautioned that 
she would need to meet a difficult level of proof at trial: “[A]t trial, Reynolds 
must show not only that she is capable of performing the essential functions of 
the job, but also that she can do so without endangering the safety of 
others.”129 
Cases such as Reynolds illustrate how courts may incorporate concerns for 
patient safety into the plaintiff’s burden of persuasion—and how this approach 
may confront work-capable individuals with employer stereotypes about what 
constitute safe methods of performance. The more inclusive alternative is to 
place the burdens of proof on the employer to show that the employee’s 
proposed method will put patients at risk—surely an important consideration, 
but one that should not isolate employer assumptions about performance 
methods from scrutiny. 
V.  REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS IN THE HEALTH CARE WORKPLACE: 
EXAMINING NEUTRAL EMPLOYER RULES 
As described above, Barnett has left a conundrum about its generalization: 
does its ruling reach beyond seniority systems to all neutral workplace rules, 
assuming them to be reasonable in the run of cases?130 Several cases illustrate 
how presumptions in favor of supposedly neutral rules might preclude 
challenges to conventional barriers to inclusion. 
A frequent problem for employees who are ill or injured is the need for 
time off work to undergo treatment and hopefully recover. Contract leave or 
Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave, although helpful, may expire before 
the employee is able to return to work, subjecting the employee to the risk of 
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discharge for unexcused absences.131 Many cases hold that requests for 
indefinite leaves of absence without any idea of when the employee may be 
able to return to work are not reasonable accommodations.132 Employers, 
however, may have rules that provide for discharge once leaves have run out, 
even when employees can set a date certain for their return. Employers may 
have these rules because it is difficult or expensive for them to hold positions 
open or because leaving a position unfilled may place burdens on other 
employees. In such cases, however, employers should be required to prove that 
the leave would be an undue hardship, rather than simply asserting adoption of 
the discharge rule. Depending on staffing structures, it might not be at all 
difficult for employers to accommodate employees with needs for extended 
time off. 
Consider Catherine LaFlamme, a nurse at Rumford Hospital.133 After a 
back injury made it difficult for her to work, she requested a reduced schedule, 
FMLA leave, a medical leave of absence for surgery, and then transfer to per 
diem status (on which the employee is part of a pool that can be called into 
work for shifts when needed by the hospital but is also free to decline these 
requests).134 The hospital had a rule of taking people off their per diem list if 
they had not worked in six months135—a neutral rule. While on per diem 
status, LaFlamme kept the hospital regularly informed about her condition and 
desire to return to work; although she updated them that she would be cleared 
to work by mid-January, she was taken off the list in mid-December after the 
six months had expired.136 Her requested accommodation was extension of the 
per diem employee termination rule; the hospital’s argument was that a request 
to hold a position open indefinitely is not a reasonable accommodation.137 
The First Circuit standard is that plaintiffs must propose accommodations that 
are reasonable on their face.138 In refusing summary judgment, the court 
concluded that LaFlamme had raised triable issues of fact on whether the leave 
she had requested was indefinite and on whether the short extension she 
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requested would be an undue hardship for the hospital.139 Notably, no 
questions of patient safety or inconvenience to others were raised in this case; 
all that was at stake was a request to be kept on the per diem list beyond the 
sixth-month period.140 
Cases involving neutral rules about attendance policies tend to be far more 
favorable to employers. For example, Forrester, a diabetic, requested to be able 
to come in late on mornings when she was having difficulty managing her 
blood sugar.141 Her employer maintained that they had tried to work with her 
to accommodate her needs but that “it would constitute a severe hardship on 
operations if we could not predict [her] arrival times within a reasonable 
degree of certainty.”142 The court agreed with the employer and granted 
summary judgment: “[T]o require an employer to accept an open-ended ‘work 
when able’ schedule for a time-sensitive job would stretch ‘reasonable 
accommodation’ to absurd proportions.”143 The case was a complex mixed-
motives case in which the employer advanced a number of reasons for firing 
Forrester.144 However, at no point did the court suggest that exploring a more 
flexible work schedule might have been a reasonable accommodation unless 
the employer could show it was an undue hardship. Instead, the court accepted 
the employer’s representation that its attendance policies were reasonable.145 
Forrester’s position was operations management, so there would have been no 
direct effects on patient care from her irregular hours.146 
VI.  ADDRESSING THE PIPELINE: ACCOMMODATION IN TRAINING AND TESTING 
Challenges to workplace barriers will be of limited avail if qualified 
workers with disabilities cannot be found to fill positions. Yet data indicate 
that although the number of students identified with disabilities is growing in 
higher education generally (to 11 percent in 2011-2012) and in graduate 
programs (to 7.6 percent in 2010), providers with disabilities remain low in 
comparison to disability percentages in the population overall.147 One 
discussion reports research under way at the University of California, San 
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Francisco (UCSF) School of Medicine attempting to determine actual numbers 
of qualified applicants and medical students with disabilities in the U.S.148 This 
discussion also underlines the need for study of creative accommodation 
solutions that eliminate barriers, maintain technical standards, and do not put 
patient safety in question.149 To address this knowledge gap, Stanford 
University and UCSF have appointed researchers to pursue evidence-based 
research of best accommodation practices.150 The extent to which the law has 
kept pace is, however, uneven—as we have seen with respect to employment 
and as we will explain in this section with respect to education, training, and 
examinations. 
One of the initial and formative cases involving disability accommodations 
in education concerned an applicant with disabilities to a nursing education 
program. Even at the time it was decided—1979—the case rested on highly 
questionable assumptions about the plaintiff’s capabilities and standards for 
accommodations, but continues to cast a shadow today. 
The case was Southeastern Community College v. Davis, the first case in 
which the Court interpreted the Rehabilitation Act.151 Davis was denied 
admission to Southeastern’s nursing program based on their conclusions that 
her hearing impairment made it impossible for her to participate safely in the 
training program or to function safely as a nurse.152 She brought suit under the 
Rehabilitation Act section 504 prohibition of discrimination against an 
“otherwise qualified handicapped individual” in federally funded programs 
solely by reason of disability.153 The evidence indicated that her hearing was 
correctable to the extent that she could detect sounds but for fully accurate 
communication would need to look directly at the speaker in order to 
supplement with lip reading.154 The trial court, in entering judgment in favor of 
Southeastern, found that in circumstances such as an operating room 
physicians and nurses wear masks, making lip reading impossible; also, nurses 
might need to respond immediately to verbal cues that Davis would be unable 
to see because of her positioning or the positioning of others.155 So the trial 
court drew the conclusion that Davis was not “otherwise qualified” and 
Southeastern was not required to accommodate her.156 The appellate court took 
a different view of the assessment of qualifications, holding that she should be 
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assessed on the basis of her academic and technical qualifications, leaving her 
disability aside.157 If she met these qualification standards, Southeastern should 
then be required to accommodate her.158 
On appeal, the Supreme Court interpreted the statutory language “solely by 
reason” of disability to mean that her disability alone could not be the reason 
for denying Davis admission to the nursing program.159 Rather, Southeastern 
could consider her capabilities with the disability in determining whether she 
was qualified for the program—that is, Southeastern could consider whether 
she was qualified in spite of her disability, not whether she was qualified 
except for her disability.160 The Court then noted that it was “undisputed” that 
the current constitution of Southeastern’s program would not permit Davis to 
function safely for patients in clinical components.161 Davis contended that she 
could function safely with modifications to the program and auxiliary aids and 
services.162 The modifications she proposed were individual supervision when 
directly attending patients and elimination of certain required courses; this last 
accommodation would leave her qualified to perform some, but not all, of the 
tasks registered nurses are licensed to perform and allow her to take some but 
not all nursing positions.163 Characterizing these suggested accommodations 
pejoratively as “affirmative action,” the Court said that they would be a 
“fundamental alteration” and interpreting the statute to require them would go 
far beyond the statutory requirement of non-discrimination in federally funded 
programs.164 As a non-discrimination requirement, section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act requires “evenhanded treatment” not “affirmative efforts to 
overcome the disabilities caused by handicaps.”165 
Our argument in Accommodating Every Body agrees in one critical respect 
with the Davis interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act and its progeny the 
ADA: as non-discrimination statutes, these statutes consider whether 
accommodations can enable persons with disabilities to perform required job 
tasks capably.166 Accommodations are required (leaving defenses aside) if they 
will allow people with disabilities to perform jobs on a par with others. Where 
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we part company with Davis lies in its uncritical acceptance of Southeastern’s 
judgments about Davis’s capabilities or the tasks required of nurses. 
In one respect, the destructive effect of Davis was soon cabined by a 
second critical Rehabilitation Act decision, Alexander v. Choate.167 This case 
addressed Tennessee’s decision to cut Medicaid costs by limiting the number 
of hospital days per year for patients.168 When patients brought suit claiming 
that this program was disability discrimination because the limitations were 
more burdensome for people with disabilities, the Supreme Court stated that 
the test was whether people with disabilities had “meaningful access” to the 
benefit in question.169 It “struck a balance” between the statutory meaningful 
access requirement and legitimate interests in the integrity of the institutions’ 
programs.170 Although the Court concluded that the Alexander plaintiffs had 
not shown that they were denied meaningful access, the meaningful access 
standard has proved a fruitful source for plaintiffs contending that public 
services are not effectively available for them.171 Only when the requested 
modification is a fundamental alteration are otherwise qualified plaintiffs 
denied changes that would give them meaningful access to public programs. 
Indeed, practices in educating health care professionals have evolved far 
beyond the assumptions made by the Southeastern College’s nursing faculty. 
To take one example, the School of Medicine at the University of California at 
Davis (UC Davis) has used technology in a surgery rotation for a medical 
student with profound hearing impairments.172 The technology is tablet 
technology that links the sounds in the operating room to an off-site 
transcriptionist and projects the transcript onto a monitor in the operating 
room.173 UC Davis described the technology as creating “a level playing field” 
that enabled the student to participate actively in the surgery, assisting just like 
other medical students are able to do.174 
To take another example, Tim Cordes, who is blind, successfully 
completed the medical scientist training program (M.D., Ph.D.) at the 
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University of Wisconsin Medical School.175 He completed visual portions of 
the program by using touch and computer programs that converted images into 
structures that can be felt.176 His accommodations included books on tape and 
in Braille, a computer that could download and convert text to speech at high 
speeds, and a computer that enabled him to make raised line drawings to 
interpret images via touch.177 Although the medical school was originally 
doubtful, concerned that the Association of Medical Colleges would be 
concerned about a medical student who could not see, he gradually won 
everyone over and completed all the tasks of other medical students.178 Cordes 
is now a practicing board-certified psychiatrist at the VA Hospital in Madison, 
specializing in treating patients with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and 
addictions.179 
David Hartman is another blind physician and was a role model for 
Cordes—the first blind graduate of a U.S. medical school, Temple University 
in 1976.180 Hartman practices psychiatry in Roanoke, Virginia, specializing in 
addictions, and is board certified in psychiatry.181 
There are also blind physicians practicing rehabilitation medicine. Stanley 
K. Yarnell, a graduate of Ohio State University Medical School and board 
certified in physical medicine and rehabilitation, recently retired as the medical 
director of rehabilitation medicine at St. Mary’s Medical Center in San 
Francisco.182 Stanley Wainapel, graduate of Boston University, is currently 
chief of the Department of Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation at Albert 
Einstein College of Medicine.183 In family practice, Spencer Lewis continued 
to practice medicine, with an expanding practice, after becoming blind.184 
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Eventually, his hospital privileges, withdrawn after he lost his sight, were 
restored, except for permission to deliver babies.185 He continued home birth 
and clinic deliveries, however.186 In 1981, Dr. Lewis helped to organize the 
American Society of Handicapped Physicians, which by 1985 had more than 
1,000 members.187 This organization evolved into the Society of Physicians 
with Disabilities, now a sub-group of the Society of Healthcare Professionals 
with Disabilities that includes physicians, pharmacists, nurses, and students 
preparing for these professions.188 
These examples are not isolated cases, moreover. Beyond the empirical 
research at UCSF and Stanford, one recent study reports a survey of fifty-six 
deaf or hearing-impaired physicians or trainees (twenty-five practicing 
physicians and thirty-one trainees) in the U.S.189 Accommodations included 
modified stethoscopes, auditory equipment, notetaking, Communication 
Access Realtime Translation (CART), signed interpretation, and oral 
interpretation.190 Most respondents reported satisfaction with their 
accommodations from educators and employees, although there were frequent 
needs to spend time arranging the accommodations.191 Interestingly, modified 
surgical masks were used infrequently although these are available and would 
permit speech visualization.192 These physicians reported strong interests in 
primary care and in treatment of deaf patients, suggesting important 
advantages for the care of such patients who are frequently underserved, such 
as language and hearing concordance or understanding of communicative 
challenges of patients.193 A report from Canada indicates that models for 
success in the United States are becoming influential in Canadian medical 
education, with impressive gains for diversity in patient care.194 
Actual numbers of students with disabilities in medical schools remain 
low, however. A recent survey of U.S. and Canadian medical schools indicated 
that about a half a percent of students had physical or sensory disabilities and 
the most common accommodations were extra time on exams, accessible 
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access, and audio recording of lectures.195 The most common impairments 
were hearing difficulties, low vision, spinal cord injury, and brain injury.196 
This study concludes that “people with [physical or sensory disabilities] are 
grossly underrepresented in U.S. medical schools, and their access . . . may not 
have improved during the last 30 years.”197 The study attributes this stasis to 
the Association of American Medical Colleges’ failure to update technical 
standards for medical students and technical standards at participating schools, 
together with medical schools’ inexperience with accommodations and lack of 
knowledge of new technological possibilities.198 The data in the study also 
suggest an unusually high attrition rate for students with disabilities who are 
admitted to medical schools; possible explanations are difficulties in obtaining 
accommodations, attitudinal barriers, or inability to demonstrate requisite 
competencies—as well as more realistic understanding of the demands of 
medicine.199 
Judicial deference to professional judgments about qualification risks leave 
existing practices intact without the careful scrutiny needed to see whether they 
are necessary for professional competence or patient safety. While some 
decisions have insisted on careful, individual evaluation of capacities with 
accommodation, others remain highly deferential to existing assumptions about 
performance. Deference is especially likely in cases involving challenges to 
examinations. 
One successful recent decision involved a hearing-impaired medical 
student at Creighton University who sought to use CART technology during 
his clinical rotations.200 During his first two years at Creighton, Argenyi had 
paid personally over $100,000 for the technology, but the medical school 
refused to allow him to continue to use it, claiming that the auxiliary aids they 
offered were sufficient.201 The trial court initially granted summary judgment 
for Creighton on the basis that Argenyi had not shown his requested 
accommodations were “necessary” and that Creighton had provided “effective 
communication.”202 The appellate court reversed, determining that Argenyi 
had raised issues of fact whether Creighton had provided him with auxiliary 
aids and services that would give him “an equal opportunity to gain the same 
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benefit from medical school as his nondisabled peers”203—citing Alexander v. 
Choate’s meaningful access standard. On remand, a jury verdict found 
Creighton had discriminated but not willfully so; Argenyi received the aids he 
requested but not restitution for his prior expenses for CART. 204 
Another recent decision concerned a visually impaired student at Palmer 
College of Chiropractic.205 Aaron Cannon requested the accommodation of a 
sighted assistant to help him with the visual parts of the program (e.g., reading 
radiographs).206 Palmer contended that the accommodation would be a 
fundamental alteration in the program as Cannon would not be performing the 
tasks himself.207 The College claimed that Cannon was not qualified because 
its technical standards included a certain level of visual proficiency—a level 
they claimed was required by the standards of the Council on Chiropractic 
Education, their national accrediting body.208 Although blind students in the 
past had graduated successfully from Palmer, the standards had been adopted 
after their graduation.209 The Davenport Civil Rights Commission decided in 
favor of Cannon: Palmer’s California campus waived vision-specific technical 
standards to accord with California civil rights law and Palmer presented no 
evidence that waiver had jeopardized their accreditation.210 The district court 
decided that the Commission had failed as a matter of law to grant appropriate 
deference to Palmer’s judgments about curricular requirements.211 The Iowa 
Supreme Court reinstated the order of the Commission, invoking the 
Rehabilitation Act regulations that state that a qualified individual is one who 
“meets the academic and technical standards requisite to admission or 
participation”212 in the educational program and citing Alexander v. Choate for 
the requirement to set a balance between meaningful access and fundamental 
alteration.213 The Iowa court summarized two guiding principles for 
fundamental alteration analysis: deference to the institution’s professional or 
academic judgment and institutional obligations to seek out suitable means of 
accommodation together will provide a factual record of conscientiously 
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carrying out this obligation.214 Institutions cannot simply rely on accepted 
academic norms, as new alternatives may be available; this is critical to assure 
that academic claims are not disguised forms of disability discrimination.215 
Palmer had failed to meet the requirement of in depth individual analysis and 
so deference to its judgments was not appropriate.216 
Other decisions have deferred to academic judgments refusing to allow 
accommodations in which students are provided with performance aids. For 
example, Emily McCulley was admitted to the University of Kansas Medical 
School but the program rescinded her admission after they determined that her 
spinal muscular atrophy meant that she could not meet their technical standard 
for physical performance.217 The accommodation she requested was help with 
lifting patients but the school determined that she would need to perform 
procedures such as resuscitation that were beyond her physical capacities.218 
Noting that in “academic matters, we often defer in substantial part to the 
professional judgment of educational institutions,” the court of appeals upheld 
summary judgment for the medical school.219 McCully had no way to rebut the 
argument that providing a staff surrogate would render her an observer rather 
than a participant; the clinical procedures that she sought surrogates for were 
part of the U.S. Medical Licensure Exam that she would need to pass. 220 Thus 
her request would be a fundamental alteration of the medical school 
curriculum.221 
Cases involving licensure examinations or board certification illustrate 
similar deference to professional judgments. For example, Roland Saavedra 
was dismissed from the residency program at the University of Wisconsin after 
he failed to pass Step 3 of the licensure exam.222 Saavedra had dyslexia, 
ADHD, and learning disabilities and required extra time on examinations.223 
However, he took the Step 3 exam twice without requesting accommodations; 
after two failures, he was granted an unpaid leave of absence to study for the 
exam and a final date within which to pass the exam.224 Although he submitted 
the requisite information for accommodations, he met with delays in receiving 
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them and was unable to take the exam within the specified time period.225 
After receiving the accommodations and passing the Step 3 exam at the next 
available scheduled time, he applied for reinstatement but was told that the 
program lacked the resources to accommodate the approximately six month 
delay.226 The court, in ruling for the program, determined that the issue of 
accommodations was between Saavedra and the licensing board, not the 
program, and that Saavedra was at fault for not having passed the examination 
within the required time frame.227 This analysis left unexamined Wisconsin’s 
rule about the time within which residents must pass—an otherwise neutral 
rule that should be questioned unless changing it is an undue hardship for the 
program—and places the blame on the person with disabilities for not having 
requested accommodations early enough in his time in the program. 
Or consider Chad Cunningham, a medical student with Irlen syndrome, a 
condition that causes severe headaches with prolonged reading and is 
aggravated by bright lights.228 He completed the first two years of medical 
school, passing all of his coursework.229 However, the test conditions for Step 
1 of the licensing exam caused him severe headaches and he failed the exam 
twice narrowly, taking it without accommodations.230 He requested 
accommodations before the second attempt, but they were denied based on 
preliminary review, with the board determining that Cunningham had not 
received accommodations in the past and needed to provide “extensive and 
voluminous” records to substantiate his disability—a request that could not be 
met before the next scheduled exam.231 University of New Mexico Medical 
School rules required Cunningham to take a leave of absence without working 
and to pass the exam within three tries and complete medical school within six 
years—requirements he could not meet given the schedule of the licensing 
exam.232 Cunningham’s requests to the University for accommodations and for 
help with his accommodation request to the licensing board were also without 
avail.233 Cunningham’s lawsuit was also unsuccessful: his claims against the 
licensing board were not ripe, because he had only received a preliminary not a 
final denial of his accommodation request.234 His claims against the medical 
school failed: like Saavedra’s, Cunningham’s problems were with the board, 
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not his medical school.235 And his medical school’s rules about the time within 
which students needed to pass the Step 1 examination and complete medical 
school were reasonable; changes in the program would be a fundamental 
alteration.236 In reaching this last conclusion, the court quoted language from 
other cases stating that “[e]ducational institutions are accorded deference with 
regard to the level of competency needed for an academic degree.”237 In this 
case as well, practices of the licensing board combined with apparently 
neutral—but not carefully scrutinized—time limitation rules to erect a barrier 
to a student with disabilities in demonstrating his capacity to perform 
competently as a physician. 
The case of David Rawdin brings into sharpest focus the incongruity 
between competent performance and licensing examinations.238 Rawdin had a 
cognitive impairment as a result of surgeries for a brain tumor that affected 
memory retrieval in abstract contexts.239 He requested accommodations for the 
physician licensing exams, which he eventually passed.240 He successfully 
completed a pediatric residency and “flourished” at the Children’s Hospital of 
Philadelphia—treating over 10,000 babies and exhibiting by all accounts 
“exemplary” performance.241 However, his position required board 
certification within five years and Rawdin met with persistent failure on the 
multiple-choice portion of the board certification exam.242 Rawdin requested 
accommodations in the form of an alternative examination structure.243 The 
American Board of Pediatrics (ABP) refused, saying that it would be far too 
difficult to construct an alternative examination and that the existing 
examination did not require Rawdin to remember facts out of context.244 The 
trial court’s verdict in favor of the ABP was upheld on appeal.245 Rawdin was 
not able to find a hospital that would grant him privileges without board 
certification246 and he currently practices as a certified mohel in 
Philadelphia.247 At the trial court, the ABP represented that it has an 
accommodations program with the goal of providing equal access but not equal 
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outcomes or unfair advantages; accommodations are not available if they are 
fundamental alterations of the certification program.248 The trial court found 
both that Rawdin was not disabled as he was not substantially impaired in the 
major life activity of test taking (even though he couldn’t pass the ABP exam 
he was a better test taker than the average member of the population) and that 
he was not entitled to the accommodation he requested.249 In reaching that last 
conclusion, the court said that just as educational institutions are granted 
deference about the requirements for academic degrees, “so too should ABP be 
granted deference regarding accommodations that would devalue 
certification.”250 To be sure, board certification is a measure of qualifications, 
but in this case deference to professional judgments coupled with institutional 
rules requiring board certification barred someone from practicing specialty 
medicine who had demonstrated capability in practice. 
In conclusion, progress towards inclusion in medical training remains 
uneven. Although reports and anecdotal cases illustrate how creative use of 
technology especially may enable people with disabilities to function capably 
in training and practice, rules such as time-to-completion requirements remain 
barriers that have not been put to the full scrutiny required by undue hardship 
or direct threat defenses. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The cases we have discussed illustrate courts grappling with complex 
issues about accommodating employees with disabilities in the health care 
workplace or in the training of health care professionals. In these cases, 
employers’ contentions about essential job responsibilities, methods of 
performance, or workplace rules are accepted too frequently without careful 
scrutiny. Allegations of risks or hardship may be left to plaintiffs to disprove as 
part of their initial showing and employers will not be pressed to justify 
decisions to continue business as usual. The result in practice may be ongoing 
exclusion of capable employees with disabilities from health care workplaces. 
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